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In the half-century beginning in 1895, Japan had assembled one of the largest
empires in modern history. This empire vanished in the summer of 1945, at the
end of the Second World War, and it seemed to fall into immediate oblivion.
Most commentators since have described Japan’s postwar decades as character-
ized by a conspicuous absence of the country’s imperial past in public debates
and political culture. “The Japanese empire,” declared Ian Nish in 1980,
“disappeared without trace.”1 According to this standard view, references to
the former colonial territories virtually disappeared, and almost instantaneously
at that, when empire ended. Although some imperial structures continued to
exist, many of these continuities were rendered invisible under the postwar
memory regime of the victimized nation. Japan’s wartime engagement in
East Asia, and its longer colonialist record in the region, remained on the side-
lines of larger social issues and conflicts. The philosopher and cultural critic
Karatani Kōjin has spoken of the “De-Asianization” of postwar discourse in
Japan as a general characteristic of the political and intellectual landscape in
the years of the economic miracle.2
The disappearance of the country’s imperial past has sometimes been
perceived as specifically Japanese, and in some ways as a continuation of
an earlier, nineteenth-century strategy to “leave Asia” (datsu-a). In fact,
however, such a narrative was not at all singular or unique, and it had many
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parallels in other countries. For instance in Germany, like Japan defeated in
World War II, the imperial past—both overseas and in the European East—
was largely eclipsed in the wake of defeat and the need to come to terms
with the fascist past.3 And even countries that lost their empire only as a
result of the postwar decolonization process, such as France or Great Britain,
were quick to forget about their imperial engagements. “The British Empire
may (or may not) have been won in a fit of ‘absence of mind,’” as David Can-
nadine opined, “but as far as the majority of the population was concerned it
was given away in a fit of collective indifference.”4 And Bernard Porter, in
The Absent-Minded Imperialists, concluded, “domestic issues were separate,
and of far more significance to most people on every level than almost any con-
cerning the empire.”5 Likewise in France, the long colonial history, and the
bloody and violent Algerian war in particular, were lost sight of soon after
the treaty of Evian.6
For a long time, the “minimal impact thesis”—according to which the end
of empire had virtually no reverberations in the metropoles—was the dominant
reading of the decolonization process.7 In recent years, though, scholarship on
postwar Europe has modified and for some parts corrected this familiar and
widespread picture of imperial amnesia, and has demonstrated the extent to
which effects of the expansionist past did indeed penetrate deep into former
imperial societies. This discussion is still in full swing, and in some cases
the scholarly literature is still in its infant stage. What has begun to emerge,
however, is a more nuanced picture. Once we leave the realm of diplomacy
and high politics, we find that the trope of imperial erasure is overly simplistic.
In most countries, albeit in a variety of very different ways, former empires
remained present in segments of popular culture, and through the effects of
postcolonial migration that had a profound impact on social conflicts and
debates about national identities.8
3 For a recent overview, see Michel Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer, eds., German Colonialism
and National Identity (London: Routledge, 2010).
4 David Cannadine, “Apocalypse When? British Politicians and British ‘Decline’ in the
Twentieth Century,” in Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock, eds., Understanding Decline: Perceptions
and Realities of British Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
261–62.
5 Andrew Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: What the British Really Thought about
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 269.
6 Benjamin Stora, La Gangrène et l’oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Editions La
Découverte, 1991).
7 This term was coined by Stuart Ward, in “Echoes of Empire,” History Workshop Journal 62
(2006): 264–78, quote 266.
8 See Stuart Ward, ed., British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 2001); WendyWebster, Englishness and Empire 1939–1965 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005); Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan
Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Catherine
Coquery-Vidrovitch, Enjeux politiques de l’histoire coloniale (Paris: Agone, 2009); Todd
Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France
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Against this backdrop, it is worth asking to what extent these insights may
also be applied to the Japanese case. In recent years, a renewed interest in
Japan’s imperial past has spawned a number of studies that have contributed
to a more complex picture of the dialectic between forgetting and remembering.
They have focused on a wide variety of actors and have demonstrated how
dynamics have shifted over time. The result is not a plain reversal of the imper-
ial erasure thesis; on the contrary, recent studies have underscored the mechan-
isms that have helped to marginalize memories of empire in the years of high
growth. But they have specified much more precisely the conditions under
which imperial continuities were at work, and how fictions of a clean slate
were able to emerge.
In this essay, I will draw on recent scholarship to arrive at a comprehensive
interpretation of the trajectories of memories of empire throughout Japan’s
postwar period. The argument will come in four parts. After a brief assessment
of the significance of Japan’s imperial possessions up until its surrender in 1945,
I will first relate the dominant view that Japan’s postwar period was characterized
by a fundamental erasure of the imperial past. While this reading continues to
have considerable analytical traction, I will then show that it is one-sided and
tends to erase, in its own way, a series of engagements with imperial legacies,
by a variety of actors, in the immediate postwar period and also, albeit to a
lesser degree, after 1960. Third, the dialectic of remembering and forgetting
needs to be understood within the context of the global Cold War and its East
Asian ramifications. And finally, I will examine how the demise of the bipolar
world order in the 1990s effectuated a resurgent interest in Japan’s Asian past,
albeit in a new guise. Put generally, this article will argue that the history of
imperial memory was not a Japanese affair alone, but must be situated within
larger processes and transformations of the postwar order in East Asia.
J A PA N ’ S EM P I R E S A N D I M P E R I A L J A PA N
Assembled between 1895 and 1945, Japan’s modern empire was one of the
largest imperial structures in the modern history of colonialism. It was an
empire acquired in several steps, and made up of different kinds of territories.
The annexations of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910 were part and parcel of
the era of high imperialism inaugurated by the scrambles for Africa in the
1880s, and for China in the late 1890s. Synchronous with many European
powers, and after 1898 the United States as well, Japan enlarged her sphere
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Margarida Calafate Ribeiro and Ana Paula Ferreira, Fan-
tasmas e Fantasias Imperiais no Imaginário Português Contemporâneo (Porto: Campo das Letras,
2003); Jacqueline Andall and Derek Duncan, eds., Italian Colonialism: Legacy and Memory
(Oxford: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005); Wim Willems, De uittocht uit Indië: De geschiedenis
van Indische Nederlanders, 1945–1995 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2001).
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of influence and secured a crucial resource base to be exploited by the metro-
pole. This empire was further enlarged when after the First World War parts of
the German possessions in the Pacific fell to Japan under the mandate system of
the League of Nations. In the interwar years, the colonial territories, most
notably Taiwan and Korea, were further integrated into the Japanese Empire
by a politics of cultural assimilation (dōka) that treated the colonized popu-
lations as legally Japanese.9 In many ways differences remained, and assimila-
tion did not preclude discrimination in such things as education, wage levels,
and access to offices and the censored public sphere. But ideologically the colo-
nies were treated within Japanese discourse as part of the nation, culminating in
provisions for linguistic homogenization and forced name changes in Korea in
the early 1940s.10
The so-called puppet regime of Manchukuo, inaugurated in 1932, was
legally not a colony but an autonomous state. Formally headed by Qing
China’s “last emperor” Pu Yi (now Kangde), it was a colony dressed up as a
state but effectively under the command of the Japanese army. Manchukuo
was not merely a continuation of Meiji Japan’s imperialism, however.
Instead, it was ruled as a modern developmental state and was an example of
what Prasenjit Duara has called the “imperialism of ‘free nations,’” a new
form of empire building that foreshadowed the rise of vassal states in the
postwar period. The ideology of rule was inflected by the strong Pan-Asian cur-
rents of the interwar period. Moreover, Japan invested heavily in the region’s
industrial development, turning Manchukuo into the most industrialized part
of all of Asia outside Japan. Japan invested more heavily in its colonies than
did any other empire. The developmentalist approach did not eliminate hierar-
chies, and Japanese rule remained characterized by exploitation and brutal sup-
pression of dissent. But with their emphasis on anti-colonial ideology,
economic investments, and legal sovereignty, and a stress on cultural simi-
larities, the Japanese intended Manchukuo to form a regional block with
Japan. In this way, it represented a departure from the nineteenth-century tra-
dition of imperialism.11
9 On the different phases of Japan’s assimilation politics, see Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming ‘Japa-
nese’: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2001).
10 For overviews of the Japanese colonial empire, see W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism
1894–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Mark Peattie and Ramon H. Myers, eds.,
The Japanese Colonial Empire 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Peter
Duus and Mark Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1991); Peter Duus, ed., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Prin-
ceton: Princeton University Press, 1996). See also Iwanami Kōza, Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi,
8 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992–1993).
11 See Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). On Manchukuo, see also Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The
Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001);
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Beginning with the war on the Chinese mainland in 1937, the Japanese
Empire was further extended to include large parts of China, and subsequently
of Southeast Asia. As is suggested by the official label of the “Greater East
Asian War” and the politico-economic goal of creating a “Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere,” territorial expansion was accompanied by a rhetoric
of Asian liberation and anti-imperialism.12 In 1942, at the moment of its great-
est extension, the empire encompassed territories spanning over 7,400,000
square kilometers. Apart from its impressive size, the Japanese Empire was
peculiar both in the degree of control to which it subjected the colonized terri-
tories and populations, and in the way the colonized territories were closely
linked to and exploited by the Japanese archipelago. Japan treated its colonies
not as distant overseas possessions but rather as parts of a hierarchical and dif-
ferentiated, but economically and ideologically integrated imperial structure.13
Japan’s empire was thus a large and variegated entity, closely linked to
Japan’s rise as a major world power. But the empire’s importance was not
limited to Japan’s international status, foreign policy, and quest for economic
autarchy. It is essential to recognize that the empire was not only a manifes-
tation of Japanese power projected abroad, but was also intimately connected
with the domestic process of Japan’s modernization. From early on, the
Meiji modernization efforts were linked to expansionist projects overseas.
Among the overriding objectives of the Meiji elite was to reverse Japan’s sub-
ordinated integration into the international order, and to achieve abolition of the
so-called “unequal treaties” concluded with global powers in the 1850s. Under
the premises of international law, the achievement of full sovereignty was con-
ditioned upon Japan’s status as a “civilized nation,” and the Meiji oligarchy saw
the ability to conquer and civilize others as a shortcut to treaty revision. Politi-
cal modernization and imperial expansion were thus not consecutive stages, but
rather mutually constitutive and synchronous.14
Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–1933 (London: Routledge,
2001).
12 See Tetsuo Najita and Harry. D. Harootunian, “Japanese Revolt against the West: Political and
Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century,” in Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan,
Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Harry D. Haroo-
tunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000); Richard F. Calichman, ed., Overcoming Modernity: Cultural
Identity in Wartime Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
13 According to official Japanese taxonomy, all territories acquired after 1889 (the promulgation
of the Meiji constitution) were considered colonies: Taiwan, Karafuto, Korea, and Nanyō. This
excluded an important dimension of Japanese empire building, namely internal colonialism in Hok-
kaido and Okinawa (“internal” because these territories were incorporated into the Japanese nation-
state as naichi, internal territories), as well as Manchukuo, which was formally not a colony but an
autonomous state.
14 See the argument by Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperial-
ism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” American Historical Review 107 (2002): 388–418. See
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This logic did not change after the consolidation of a territorial empire. In
their impact, interventions were never simply confined to the colonies, but
always had repercussions on the Japanese archipelago.15 Gotō Shimpei
(1857–1929), the empire’s chief architect, treated Taiwan as a sort of laboratory
where technologies of modernization—ranging from urban planning to sanitary
measures and the politics of hygiene—could be tested before being applied to
the metropole, most notably in the reconstruction of Tokyo after the earthquake
of 1923.16 The most important testing ground, however, was Manchukuo.
Louise Young has demonstrated how Manchuria was turned into a laboratory
for what the “new bureaucrats” of the Shōwa period envisioned as Japanese
modernity. The new capital, Xinjing, was developed as a model city with geo-
metrical structure, green spaces, and parks, with a sanitary infrastructure and
modern sewage system long before these technologies became standard in
Japan. Beyond city planning, reformers fused Soviet models of a planned
economy with the Pan-Asian discourse of autarchic production and the forms
of total wartime mobilization in order to test economic theories before applying
them to Japan.17 The bottom line of this recent scholarship is very clear: Japan’s
empire was never just “out there”; it was closely linked to the metropole,
beyond the more than 320,000 Japanese settlers who had migrated to Man-
churia. The empire was, quite literally, an inextricable ingredient of imperial
Japan.
N A R R AT I V E S O F I N S TA N T D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N
This large and far-flung empire rapidly came undone in the summer of 1945.
Unconditional surrender not only brought the hostilities of World War II to a
close, but also marked the end of Japan’s overseas possessions. To many con-
temporaries, this shift seemed almost instantaneous. Emperor Hirohito’s sur-
render speech of 15 August 1945—more than the official capitulation on 2
September—burned itself into the memories of large parts of the Japanese
population. In general parlance, this “zero hour” divided the prewar (senzen)
from the postwar (sengo), and imperial from occupation, and then high-growth
also Andre Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan,
A Review Article,” Journal of Asian Studies 59 (2000): 951–76.
15 This argument has been made most forcefully by scholars in the field of postcolonial studies.
See, for example, Kang Sang-jung, Orientarizumu no kanata e: Kindai bunka hihan (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Tomiyama Ichirō, Kindai Nihon shakai to ‘Okinawajin’: “Nihonjin” ni
naru to iu koto (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1990); Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering
Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
16 Hashiya Hiroshi, Teikoku Nihon to shokuminchi toshi (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004).
17 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). On city planning, see also Koshizawa Akira,Man-
shūkoku no shuto keikaku: Tōkyō no genzai to mirai o tou (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1988).
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Japan. The notion of an absolute discontinuity across the 1945 divide became
one of the foundational myths for the new and reborn Japan (shinsei Nippon).18
Along similar lines, historians have tended to narrate the fate of Japan’s
empire as a story of what could be called “instant decolonization.” According
to this dominant view, the empire disappeared all of a sudden and left hardly a
trace. The redrawing of boundaries in East Asia had been part of Allied wartime
planning and received sanction at the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. With
unconditional surrender, the colonized territories were severed from a Japan
now confined to the four islands of the archipelago: The “island nation” (shi-
maguni) was born, self-sufficient and inward looking. Consequently, to
many Japanese the colonial possessions appeared not as liberated or gradually
ceded but rather, as simply gone. As a result, “Japan’s empire was terminated
with little discussion.”19
This view is typically linked to an argument according to which Japan did
not experience the pangs and conflicts of the drawn out and frequently violent
processes of imperial devolution suffered by other global powers. The Japanese
Empire, states Leo Ching, “has liquidated itself without going through the process
of decolonization.”20 In this line of reasoning, there was no parallel in East Asia to
the decade-long fights with the Algerian National Front that brought France to the
verge of a coup d’état and led to bloodshed, torture, and massacre, even in Paris,
to the Mau Mau war, or to the painful retreat of British settlers from Kenya and
Rhodesia. This is, of course, only partially true, since there was strong and violent
local resistance to Japanese rule in the years before 1945, driven by a variety of
local groups, many of which fought in the name of national liberation. In many
ways, the military conflict in China, as well as the forays of different Korean
groups based in Manchuria, Shanghai, and Korea itself should be seen as parts
of decolonization struggles, and the same can be said of the war against Japan
in Southeast Asia. But while these conflicts are remembered in many Asian
societies as steps toward national liberation and decolonization, in Japan they
were perceived primarily as concomitants of world war. Therefore, the loss of
empire was understood by many as a form of immediate decolonization effected
largely by external forces, what Lori Watt has called “third-party-decoloniza-
tion.”21 The former empire, therefore, “was never of domestic concern; it was
the problem of other nations.”22
18 Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” Public Culture
10 (1997): 1–23.
19 Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 3.
20 Leo Ching, “‘Give Me Japan and Nothing Else!’: Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of
Colonialism,” in Tomiko Yoda and Harry Harootunian, eds., Japan after Japan: Social and Cul-
tural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 148.
21 Watt, When Empire Comes Home.
22 Ching, “‘Give Me Japan’,” 148. For a similar reading, see Tomiyama Ichirō, Sensō no kioku
(Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1995), 108–12.
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This paradigm of instant disappearance is not a simple projection by his-
torians; it was supported by a reconfiguration of postwar Japan, under con-
ditions of the U.S. occupation, that was conducive to a vision of the past,
and future, that extracted Japan from its regional contexts. On the most
general level, this found expression in a rhetoric that simply avoided imperial
references. “Our nation, pressed back to the small Japan at the time of the Meiji
Restoration, should draw lessons for the future from past mistakes, turn over a
new page and immediately start to build a new Japan,” declared Prince Higa-
shikuni, the transitional prime minister after surrender in 1945.23 This new
Japan was to be small, and thus non-imperial, and it was to move its orientation
away from Asia and toward the West. The renowned social scientist Maruyama
Masao famously called for a “third opening of the country” (kaikoku).24
Under the conditions of the American military presence, the new consti-
tution, and economic recovery, the Japanese government firmly pursued a
policy of alignment with the West. The seven-year U.S. occupation helped
reformat public life, the political order, and the sense many Japanese had of
their place in the world. Even after the occupation ended, the security treaties
tied Japan to the overall military strategy of the United States. Economically,
the close links with the occupying power guaranteed virtually unrestricted
access to Western markets, especially in the United States. At the same time,
Asia’s relevance as an economic partner was in steep decline.25 Waves of
Americanization affected consumer demand, everyday life, and popular
culture, and facilitated a turn away from Japan’s imperial hinterland. The
result was a Japan that was again poised to “leave Asia and join the West,”
as Fukuzawa Yukichi had postulated in 1885.26
This was especially apparent in the way in which the imperial context was
expunged from narratives of Japan’s modern history. In this process the U.S.
occupation played a crucial role. It contributed to casting the history of war
and fascism essentially in domestic terms, as a war that was caused primarily
by internal factors and could thus be addressed by measures of social reform.
A good example of this domestication of the past was the Tokyo War Crimes
Trial. As suggested by the official wording of the indictment, the trial dealt
23 Quoted in Asano Toyomi, Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hōsei (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku
Shuppankai, 2008), 571.
24 Maruyama Masao, “Kaikoku,” in Maruyama Masao Shū, vol. 8 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten,
1996), 45–86.
25 See Aaron Forsberg, America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan’s
Postwar Economic Revival, 1950–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
26 On the presence of the United States in Japan, see: John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in
the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 1999); Yoshimi Shun’ya, “‘America’ as Desire and
Violence: Americanization in Postwar Japan and Asia during the Cold War,” in Kuan-Hsing Chen
and Beng Hua Chua, eds., Inter Asia Cultural Studies Reader (London: Routledge 2007), 246–66;
Michael Auslin, Pacific Cosmopolitans: A Cultural History of U.S.—Japan Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press 2011).
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with a war whose causes lay at home and could thus be understood and reme-
died internally: “It is necessary to consider in the first place the domestic
history of Japan during the same period…. Indeed the answers to the questions
‘Why did these things happen?’ and ‘Who were responsible for their occur-
rence?’ will often only be found if the contemporaneous history of Japanese
domestic politics is known.”27
Fifteen years of war on the Asian mainland and the complicated inter-
national context of Japan’s expansionist politics notwithstanding, the occu-
pation authorities chose to relegate the imperial context to the fringes of
Japan’s history. It was no accident, then, that many significant crimes and atro-
cities committed by Japan in its Asian empire played only a marginal role in the
trial proceedings. “Where postwar Britain confronted the loss of empire and
France struggled for years to come to terms with Algeria,” as Carol Gluck
has phrased it, “Japan turned away from its imperial past in Asia into the
waiting embrace of the future and of the United States.”28
This embrace, it is important to recognize, was part and parcel of the
global Cold War regime. This larger geopolitical framework was a major
factor that colluded with, and made possible the postwar marginalization of
empire. The imperial retreat in public memory was thus not simply or entirely
the product of conscious decisions and vested interests, but was also in some
ways the effect of the larger international context. The silencing of Asia corre-
sponded with the great divide of the Cold War, the incorporation of Japan into a
Western/capitalist world order dominated by the United States, and the inser-
tion of neighboring countries into Cold War geopolitics less as Asian than as
communist. Under the umbrella of the security treaty with the United States,
official Japan aligned itself firmly with “the West.” In Europe and the United
States, as well, the Japan of the economic miracle came to be regarded, in
Noam Chomsky’s words, “as honorary European.”29
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But this was not the entire story. In Japan, as elsewhere, various groups and
individuals competed over different versions of the past and its broader
significance—accounts of the empire and claims about its continued relevance
to society were conflictual and contested. Particularly in the early postwar
27 B.V.A. Röling and C. F. Rüter, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE):
The Tokyo Judgment, 29 April 1946–12 November 1948, vol. 1. (Amsterdam: APA-University
Press Amsterdam, 1977), 53. See also Awaya Kentarō, Tōkyō saibanron (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten,
1989); Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World
War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
28 Carol Gluck, “Operations of Memory: ‘Comfort Women’ and the World,” in Sheila Miyoshi
Jager and Rana Mitter, eds., Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 47–77, here 51.
29 Noam Chomsky, “The New World Order,” Agenda 62 (1991): 13–15, here 13.
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years, the impact of former imperial links and the effects of the forced severing
of them could still be felt in Japan, and traces of the vanished empire lingered
on as a sometimes awkward presence. Immediate forgetting does not exhaust
the reactions of individuals and interest groups, and through the late 1940s
and the 1950s Japanese in some social milieus felt the dissolution of the
empire much more deeply than official discourse would suggest.
Furthermore, the embrace by the United States was an anathema to many
intellectuals on the left, who pursued radically different political and ideologi-
cal alternatives. Some Marxist thinkers interpreted U.S. hegemony in the
region, and the Japanese government’s role as a client state in the new world
order, as a new form of colonial relationship, particularly during the 1950s.
This can be understood, in part, as a reaction to the so-called “reverse
course” in occupation policy, when the earlier focus on democratization was
replaced with one on economic recovery, political stability, and
anti-communism. That effectively ended what had been the Japanese left’s
early infatuation with the occupation.30 While many intellectuals had wel-
comed the Americans as a liberation force, they now began to portray their
presence in terms of colonial rule. Influential historian Inoue Kiyoshi, for
example, described Japan’s relationship to its American protector as follows:
“For six years we have been deprived of our sovereignty, we have been
placed under the occupation of foreign armies; our fatherland is being trans-
formed into a colony more and more every year, and all of Japan is becoming
a military base of a foreign power.”31 One venue in which such postcolonial
sentiments were expressed was the demands for the return to Japan of
Okinawa, in many ways Japan’s first colony, annexed in 1879, but now held
by the United States (until 1972).32
This perspective was also projected onto Japan’s past. In the 1950s, histor-
ians like Inoue began to wrestle their field’s interpretation of the Meiji Restor-
ation away from its exclusive focus on internal class struggle, and instead
emphasized the imperialist context of the late nineteenth century. In the early
1960s, historians stressed the Meiji Restoration’s commonalities with the
Great Rebellion in India (the so-called “mutiny”) and the Taiping Rebellion
in China, thereby reframing it as an instance of resistance against Western
imperialism in Asia.33 It is difficult to miss a certain irony in the fact that the
30 On the “reverse course,” see Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the
Remaking of Japan 1945–1952 (Kent, Oh.: Kent State University Press, 1989). For intellectual
debates in the early postwar years, see J. Victor Koschmann, Revolution and Subjectivity in
Postwar Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
31 Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon gendaishi 1: Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1951).
32 See Yamano Kōkichi, Okinawa henkan hitorigoto (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1982).
33 Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon gendaishi 1: Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1951);
Ubukata Naokichi, Tōyama Shigeki, and Tanaka Masatoshi, eds., Rekishizō saikōsei no kadai:
Rekishigaku no hōhō to Ajia (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1966).
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notion of empire was taken up primarily to portray Japan as the colonized, not
the colonizer. One can read this example—along with the dominant trope of
erasure—as an attempt to avoid the issue of Japanese imperialism altogether,
but this is only partially correct. Many Marxist historians perceived Japanese
wartime expansion as but one facet of a larger imperialist project, which they
understood in terms of global capitalist exploitation; in this light, their protests
against U.S. imperialism in postwar Asia were, in essence, a continuation of
their earlier critiques of Japan’s imperial projects.34
The Chinese revolution in 1949 was a prominent catalyst for debates about
a new Asian order that would offer political and cultural options beyond alle-
giance with the West. The sinologist and cultural critic Takeuchi Yoshimi, an
early opponent of Japan’s wartime politics of the “Greater East Asian Prosper-
ity Sphere,” was the most prominent spokesperson and lobbyist for a Japanese
postwar Asian turn. Infatuated with the energy and dynamic of China’s social
transformation, Takeuchi prescribed China’s quest for an indigenous modernity
as a remedy for what he perceived to be Japan’s empty and derivative
westernization.35
Beyond these intellectual debates, in the early postwar years the afteref-
fects of imperial demise were palpable on an everyday level. Most affected
were those who had taken part in the massive trans-border mobility that
empire had unleashed—expansionist policies had sent millions into the colo-
nies and occupied territories. After 1945, a chief concern of Allied politics
was to disentangle the population groups that, in a post-imperial age, were to
be allocated to different, sometimes new, nation-states. Some seven million
Japanese nationals (about 3.7 million soldiers and 3.2 million civilians) were
outside of the Japanese islands at war’s end, and they were repatriated to
Japan after the surrender. These included large numbers of settlers and their
families who, with incentives from and backing by the state, had migrated to
Manchuria since the 1920s.
Most of the returning civilians and soldiers arrived in Japan in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the war. Before entering the country, they were quarantined
aboard ships, and then bathed, disinfected, and inoculated against diseases
such as cholera, smallpox, tetanus, and typhus—as if the hygienic measures
had the power to wash off the imprint of empire. On the whole, Japanese
society did not welcome the returnees, since they added to postwar distress
and recalled bygone and now obsolete and defunct imperial ambitions. Late
34 Yoon Keu-Cha, “Sengo rekishigaku no Ajiakan,” in Asao Naohiro et al., eds., Nihon tsūshi,
Bekkan 1: Rekishiishiki no Genzai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 249–79; Narita Ryūichi, Kin-
gendai Nihonshi to rekishigaku: Kakikaerarete kita kakkō (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2012).
35 Takeuchi Yoshimi, Kindai no chōkoku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983). On Takeuchi, see
Oguma Eiji, “Minshu” to “Aikoku”: Sengo Nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei (Tokyo: Shin-
yōsha, 2002), 394–446; Richard Calichman, Takeuchi Yoshimi: Displacing the West (Ithaca:
Cornell East Asia Series, 2004).
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returnees, especially, were often greeted with suspicion because they were pre-
sumed to have been raped (the women returning from Manchuria) or politically
indoctrinated (when returning from the Soviet Union). Many returnees took
years to come to terms with the traumas of relocation and integration. While
many felt like social outcasts in their home country, others tried to refashion
themselves as experts on things foreign, as cultural intermediaries with lived
experience overseas. Returnees formed associations and self-help groups,
and established newsletters and newspapers, to organize and to lobby the gov-
ernment for compensation.36
Conversely, at the war’s end large numbers of colonial subjects were
living in Japan—an estimated two million Koreans, fifty-six thousand
Chinese, and thirty-five thousand Taiwanese. Many had been brought there
during the war years, often through forced conscription, and many had
worked in harsh and unsafe environments such as coalmines. Immediately
after the Japanese surrender, the Allies began to “move people in ways that
reversed, at high speed, the migrations of the colonial period.”37 Already by
November 1945, about a million Koreans had left, on their own and without
official support, and the next four years saw another five hundred thousand
depart. During that time, return migration was inhibited by strict regulations
that stifled illegal back-and-forth mobility between Japan and Korea. Those
who chose to remain—including some six hundred thousand Korean speak-
ers—were subjected to a variety of discriminatory measures, epitomized by
symbolic fingerprinting during alien registration. Koreans formed a postcolo-
nial presence that served as a reminder of the imperial past, even though in
public discourse much of that experience was subdued well into the 1980s.38
The peace movement supplies a further example of how memory of
Japan’s imperial past spilled over into postwar Japanese society. A strong pacif-
ist sentiment developed in the early postwar decades, spurred by both the
impact of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a desire to break with Japan’s aggres-
sive foreign policy. Frequently, this sentiment was the product of critical self-
appraisal by people who had once supported the regime’s wartime efforts or
been infatuated with its propaganda promises. The peace movement’s leaders
were not only intellectuals, and it was supported by grassroots movements
and organized labor. Indeed, peace was on the agenda of most social
36 See Watt,When Empire Comes Home; Narita Ryūichi, “‘Hikiage’ to ‘Yokuryū,’” in Aiko Ku-
rasawa, ed., Iwanami kōza: Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō, Volume 4: Teikoku no sensō keiken (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 2006).
37 Watt, When Empire Comes Home, 2.
38 John Lie, Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Hiroshi Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contempor-
ary Japan (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001); Yamawaki Keizō, Kindai Nihon to gaikokujin
rōdōsha (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1994); Pak Chon Myon, ed., Zainichi Chōsenjin: Rekishi,
genjō, tenbō (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1995).
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movements in the early postwar years. The Korean War further convinced
many groups of the urgent need for a rigid anti-war stance, and sparked
protests.39
But some of the peace movement’s actions have exemplified the ambigu-
ous place the former empire occupies in Japanese public memory. For example,
while activists sympathized with the struggles of other Asian peoples and
denounced war in general terms, only rarely did they explicitly recognize
Japan’s responsibility for imperial rule and wartime atrocities committed in
Asia. And gradually the movement shifted its primary point of reference
away from a critique of Japan’s own war and toward the renewed nuclear
threat. The so-called “Lucky Dragon” incident in 1954, when a Japanese
tuna fishing boat was exposed to nuclear fallout from U.S. tests on the
Bikini Atoll, allowed Yasui Kaoru to turn the demand for antinuclear peace
from a cause driven by leftist labor unions into a non-partisan,
middle-of-the-road movement that attracted masses of people, among them
many women. The separation of the peace agenda from Japan’s imperial past
and the focus on the atomic experience as a “singular national principle”
(yuiitsu nashonaru (kokuminteki) na genri), as political scientist Sakamoto
Yoshikazu called it in 1961, helped to garner popular support for the move-
ment. “While it is unavoidable,” Sakamoto declared, “that memories of war
damage and awareness of war responsibility tend with the passage of time to
be seen as past issues, the issue of nuclear bombs forces itself on us, on the
young generations especially, as a future problem.”40
T R A C E S O F EM P I R E I N H I G H - G R OW TH J A PA N
As these examples show, while repercussions from the imperial past continued
to affect postwar society, memories of empire as expressed in public discourse
waned over time. I will argue in this section that the sidelining of the imperial
past increased after about 1960, that this marginalization was a feature more of
state-sponsored memory and the public sphere than of people’s everyday per-
ceptions, and that it was exaggerated, retrospectively, by a historiography that
constructed sweeping narratives of Japan’s postwar imperial “amnesia.”
The timing of this marginalization was not due to internal Japanese trajec-
tories alone, but was also influenced by various international economic and pol-
itical factors and how they interacted with Japanese developments. Two of
these are of special relevance here: First, Japan’s economic recovery and emer-
gence as a high-growth nation, beginning in the mid-1950s, together with
39 Mari Yamamoto, Grassroots Pacifism in Post-War Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation (London:
Routledge, 2004). For the intellectual background, see Oguma, “Minshu” to “aikoku.”
40 Sakamoto Yoshikazu, “Kenryoku seiji to heiwa undō,” Sekai 191 (Nov. 1961), 11–23, here:
20. See also James Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar
Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2001).
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political consolidation in the so-called “1955 system,” which secured a quasi-
monopoly on political power for the Liberal Democratic Party, created through
a merger of two conservative parties, strengthened Japan’s alignment with the
industrialized countries of the West and further distanced it from Asia. Second,
the large civil-society movement that opposed the Japan-U.S. security treaty
was defeated in violent struggles in 1960, and this both solidified Japan’s pos-
ition on the Western side of the Cold War divide, and undermined activists and
social reformers who had worked to sustain a public, critical perspective on
Japan’s imperial past.41 These larger processes did not automatically lead to
an eclipse of empire, but they all helped create structures that facilitated the
pursuit of an agenda of imperial ignorance, and made it more difficult and
less plausible for social groups to insist on the relevance of such memories.
As a consequence, by the 1960s the imperial past was subsumed under
what historians have termed the “victim consciousness” of postwar Japan.
As James Orr has argued, the notion of victimhood had emerged as the domi-
nant discourse about the recent past, tapped into by groups across the political
spectrum. Within this logic, the Japanese nation was depicted as the object of
suppression, power, and circumstance: honorable politicians (and the emperor)
were the victims of staunch militarists, the people were victims of their leaders,
and Japan was the first and sole victim of the atomic bomb.42 Only a small
number of oppositional activists picked up the memory of Japanese atrocities,
such as the Nanjing massacre and the experiments in biological warfare. These
critical voices were largely neglected, and even suppressed, in official and
state-sponsored memory, which was influenced by powerful groups of
former imperialists disinclined to address their personal wartime roles.43
Against this backdrop of widespread victim consciousness, some Japanese
nationalists began to denounce their country’s dependent position within what
they perceived to be an informal U.S. empire. The most prominent example
was Hayashi Fusao’s book Approving of the Greater East Asian War, which
provoked a public stir when it was published in 1964. Hayashi interpreted all
of modern Japanese history, from 1853 when American ships landed in the
bay of Uraga to 1952 when American occupation forces left the country, as a
41 George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966); Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in
Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2001).
42 For the occupation period, see John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World
War II (New York: Norton, 1999); Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censor-
ship in Occupied Japan (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).
43 See Orr, Victim as Hero; Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan,
1945–2006 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). For the concept of “victimhood nation-
alism,” see also Jie-Hyun Lim, “Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourn-
ing and Global Accountability,” in Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad, eds., Memory in a
Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 2010,
138–62.
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“Hundred Years War” against the West. From this view, the Second World War
appeared as a mere episode in an epic struggle between Asia and the “West.”
According to Hayashi, Japan during this period had taken on the task of
freeing Asia from Western influence. “The Great Asian War … was the fate
which had been placed on Japan’s shoulders over these hundred years.”44
Even if such extreme views remained, on the whole, a minority position,
they demonstrate the extent to which it was again possible to employ an openly
imperialist rhetoric. Hayashi’s polemic is representative of the tendency to
slight Japan’s aggressive and expansionist politics in Asia. The book mapped
Japan decidedly as an Asian nation, and through its explicit discussion of the
Japanese Empire it drew on strands of memory that in the public sphere
were frequently disavowed. This dialectic of marginalization and remembering
characterized much of the period between the mid-1950s and the 1980s.
On one hand, the public relevance of the imperial past did decrease, and
Japan’s incorporation into the Cold War regime helped delete, to some
extent, the former empire from public consciousness. The seismic shift in
Japan’s postwar geopolitical orientation led large parts of the population,
among them critical intellectuals and social reformers, to frame their visions
of Japan’s past and future squarely within the borders of the nation-state. On
the other hand, the social experience of empire never entirely disappeared.
But the remaining traces of imperial connections were frequently rendered
invisible by a discourse that celebrated Japan as Western, democratic, and fun-
damentally newborn.
A telling example of this dialectic is found in narratives of the recent war.
Up until surrender in 1945, the wartime regime had glorified the conflict as the
“Greater East Asian War” (daitōa sensō), a propaganda term coined just a few
days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. One of the first interventions by the
American occupation authorities was to prohibit further use of this label.
Instead, ‘Pacific War’ (taiheiyō sensō) was introduced as the official name in
Japan of the Second World War. The change in vocabulary had a double
effect. Ostensibly it was directed against revisionist historiography, which
sought to justify the war as a gift by the Japanese to the suppressed peoples
of Asia. More importantly, it implied a fundamental shift in the spatial imagin-
ary of the conflict: the geographical center of the war was no longer China,
where Japanese armies had fought for nearly fourteen years, exacting an esti-
mated toll of over twenty million Chinese lives. Instead, the conflict with the
United States took center stage, with the attack on Pearl Harbor as the historical
watershed that gave the war its meaning and its name.45
44 Hayashi Fusao, Daitōa sensō kōteiron (Tokyo: Banchō Shobō, 1964).
45 Richard Minear, “Nihon no rekishika to sensō, 1945–1965nen,” in Nakamura Masanori et al.,
eds., Sengo Nihon. Senryō to sengo kaikaku, Volume 5: Kako no seisan (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1995), 133–56.
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Despite this interpretative imbalance, the imposition of the new label was
highly effective and endured long after the occupation had ended. Indeed, it
rendered it difficult to address the war’s Asian dimensions. When historian
Ienaga Saburō presented his now classic study of the war in 1968, against
the background of the student movement and the widespread concern with
the “Third World,” he chose to focus primarily on the war on the Asian main-
land, particularly in China. He nevertheless opted to call his book “The Pacific
War,” because otherwise—as he admitted in the preface—he feared that readers
would not know what the book was actually about.46
In this discursive landscape, political claims made with respect to the
country’s colonial past could prove difficult to register. Many of the concerns
of and demands made by former colonized nations reverberated only weakly in
Japan. An example is the negotiations over normalization of relations with
South Korea, conducted in 1964–1965 between Prime Ministers Ikeda and
Satō, as well as Korean President Park Chung Hee. Under massive U.S.
pressure, Japan was willing to settle accounts with the past and assist an econ-
omically ailing Korea, but only under the condition that South Korea would
renounce its right to demand reparations and not press for an official
apology. In return, Japan agreed to pay large sums that the treaty’s official
wording portrayed, not as compensation for wartime crimes and colonial
rule, but rather as “economic cooperation.”47
Victim consciousness, and a concomitant negligence of imperial traces,
was the hegemonic discourse of the long postwar decades, and this has led
many commentators to conclude that a critical consciousness of decolonization
failed to emerge in high-growth Japan.48 As apposite as this observation is, it
should not lead us to ignore counterexamples altogether. There was never an
absolute lack of critical reflection on Japan’s wartime empire.49 Recent scholar-
ship has begun to unearth the largely forgotten history of Japanese engage-
ments with Asia. Individuals and pressure groups occasionally did campaign
for anti-imperialist views of the colonial legacy. The range of interest groups
and memory activists was heterogeneous and diverse. On the political left,
organizations such as the Teacher’s Union and the General Council of Trade
Unions were sympathetic to critical readings of Japan’s Asian past, and specific
interests groups such as the Japan-China Friendship Association denounced
46 Ienaga Saburō, Taiheiyō sensō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 4.
47 See Seraphim, War Memory, 202–6; Asano Toyomi, “The Collapse of the Japanese Empire
and the Normalization of Its Relations with South Korea (1945–1965): Repatriation, Reparations,
and External Assets Reconsidered,” in Matsusato Kimitaka, ed., Comparative Imperiology
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2010), 109–29.
48 Kang Sang-Jung, Ajia kara Nihon o tou (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994); Kuan-Hsing Chen,
Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
49 For an early example, see Ubukata Naokichi, Tōyama Shigeki, and Tanaka Masatoshi, eds.,
Rekishizō saikōsei no kadai: Rekishigaku no hōhō to Ajia (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1966).
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“American imperialism” and a resurging “Japanese militarism” in the late
1960s.50 In some cases, such as that of the Philippines, reconciliatory practices
emerged out of instances of mutual remembrance that would eventually lead to
official Japanese apologies, which did not find an equivalent in most other
countries.51
One early witness of this process was the journalist Honda Katsuichi. His
experience in Southeast Asia helped motivate him to embark on a study tour
through China in the early 1970s. His travel reports (serialized as Chûgoku
no tabi in 1971) and his interviews with victims of Japanese atrocities were
intended to undermine the prevalent notion of Japan as a victim nation. His
unearthing of the gruesome facts about the Nanjing massacre in 1937 triggered
a heated public debate. The conservative mainstream denied any such alle-
gations, but beginning in the mid-1970s, the first careful accounts of the mas-
sacre began to make their way into high school textbooks.52 The debate about
Nanjing also worked to support the case of historian Ienaga Saburō, who sued
the Japanese state in a trial over textbook censorship that, together with its
various ancillary procedures, lasted until the 1990s. Ienaga, whose struggle
was supported by a number of civic grassroots organizations, campaigned for
a critical perspective on the war, and on Japan’s actions in its Asian empire.53
The Vietnam War did much to mobilize thinkers and activists on the left.
Many of them assailed the political establishment, which they saw to be respon-
sible for Japan’s alignment with the Western countries against their brothers
and sisters in Asia. The public outcry over U.S. atrocities in Southeast Asia
led some, like Honda Katsuichi, to probe Japan’s own violent past in Asia,
and novels like Ibuse Masuji’s Black Rain (Kuroi ame) testify to the Vietnam
War’s role as a catalyst for critical reappraisals of Japan’s imperialist history.54
At the same time, the fervent and at times violent movement against the
Vietnam War was ambiguous in how it drew upon Japan’s own imperial
past. For one prominent spokesperson of the movement, Oda Makoto (1932–
50 Seraphim, War Memory.
51 Nakano Satoshi, Tōnan Ajia senryō to Nihonjin: Teikoku/Nihon no kaitai (Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 2012).
52 Katsuichi Honda, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National
Shame (Armonk: East Gate Book 1999). On the debate, see Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the
“Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
53 On the Ienaga trials, see B. C. Duke, Japan’s Militant Teachers: A History of the Left-Wing
Teachers’ Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 1973); Laura Hein and Mark
Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United
States (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000).
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2007), the “most important factor” of his commitment to the protests against
U.S. imperialism in East Asia was his “war experience of twenty-one years
ago,” and thus the “experience of a victim.” Oda mentioned Japan’s imperial
role in Southeast Asia only in passing; and when he did, he referred to a war
that “in effect … resulted in the liberation and independence of Asia and
Africa.” Privileged as a parallel to the American bombing of Vietnam were
the American air raids on Osaka in 1945, not the Japanese attacks on Southeast
Asia. This characteristic superimposition of the Second World War on the
Vietnam War allowed some Japanese activists to read their protest against
U.S. imperialism as part of a shared Asian struggle.55
In many cases, then, the former colonial links fell into oblivion. Even
where traces of empire persisted, they could be discursively erased by stripping
them of their imperial connotations. Examples are manifold, and include the
ongoing territorial dispute over the Linancourt Rocks—known as Dokdo in
Korean and Takeshima in Japanese—annexed in 1905 when Japan established
a protectorate over Korea.56 Another case in point is the role of Korean and
Okinawan workers whose low-paid labor was integrated into the Japanese
economy in the 1960s. In general, labor immigration had a modest impact
on Japanese economic growth, but in specific industries, especially in the
Kansai region, the contribution of their work was felt, if hardly recognized.
Less acknowledged still were the imperial structures that had propelled these
workers into Japan’s mining and construction sectors in the first place.57
Similarly, Japan’s foreign aid through the mid-1980s went primarily to ter-
ritories formerly subjected to Japanese rule. In the wake of the 1951 peace
treaty with the United States, Japan agreed to pay reparations for damages
caused by the war. Though these expenditures were relatively small, they
worked to the long-term advantage of Japanese exports. Because aid was
mostly tied to procurements from Japan, the donations helped Japanese finan-
cial institutions make inroads and established markets for Japanese goods. Yet
the structural links to the former empire were hardly discussed.58
Finally, the debates about Japan as a developmental state, and about the
way in which the high growth of the 1960s was predicated on a corporate
55 Quotes from Simon Andrew Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the
Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).
56 See Paul Midford, “Challenging the Democratic Peace? Historical Memory and the Security
Relationship between Japan and South Korea,” Pacific Focus 23, 2 (2008): 189–211.
57 See Hiromi Mori, Immigration Policy and Foreign Workers in Japan (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1997); Lie, Zainichi; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Con-
trols in the Postwar Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Komai, Foreign
Migrants. For a longer historical perspective, see Ken C. Kawashima, The Proletarian Gamble:
Korean Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).
58 On Japanese foreign aid in the 1960s and 1970s, see E. C. Harrell, Japan’s Postwar Aid Pol-
icies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973); Kunio Yoshihara, Japanese Investment in
Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 1978).
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“system” established in the 1930s and 1940s, have largely followed a similar
pattern. Rarely explored is the extent to which this restructuring, and possibly
also postwar growth, was linked to economic integration in East Asia, particu-
larly the incorporation of Manchuria, that was made possible by imperial struc-
tures.59 In sum, postwar Japan was built, in complex ways, on colonial legacies
that were to a large extent obscured.60
One place where this is apparent is in the many retrospective narratives
produced by soldiers and settlers who returned from the empire. As already
noted, close to seven million Japanese were moved back to the archipelago
in the wake of defeat and surrender in 1945. Starting in the 1950s, official his-
tories of repatriation were published by the Health Ministry, as the institution
responsible for the return. In addition, individual returnees published their
memories, mostly between 1960 and 1990. Most of these texts evoked the
notion of a clinical separation of Japan from its empire, and most begin their
account on 15 August 1945, the day of the surrender. In this way, the imperial
past disappeared from the biographies of the very Japanese that had made the
empire.61
A similar pattern can be observed in the very different and in many ways
exceptional cases of the stragglers—the late-returning soldiers. Throughout the
1950s, Japanese soldiers occasionally returned to Japan from battlefields in
Southeast Asia where they had endured, hidden, and sometimes fought ima-
gined enemies long after the war’s end. Those who came back in the early
postwar period were either ignored or treated as aberrations, as wild jungle
men. Their reception changed considerably in later years, when the individual-
ity of the returning soldiers was increasingly recognized, and their attitude was
praised as exemplary patriotism. The most celebrated case was Onoda Hirō,
who surrendered in 1974 after having held out for almost thirty years in Philip-
pine’s jungle. Onoda apparently did not know that the war had ended; over the
years he had killed about thirty Filipinos and was willing to surrender only to
his former wartime commanding officer. He was immediately popular in Japan,
and published a best-selling autobiography. Strikingly, however, in public dis-
course even Onoda was not primarily associated with empire, but was hailed as
59 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy,
1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); John Dower, “The Useful War,” in
J. Dower, ed., Japan in War and Peace (New York: New Press, 1993), 9–32; Noguchi Yukio,
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representing spiritual and social values that seemed to have vanished in materi-
alist and consumerist Japan.62
MOD E R N I Z AT I O N T H E O RY AND T H E MA R G I N A L I Z AT I O N O F EM P I R E
The public marginalization of the imperial past was part and parcel of a founda-
tional narrative of internal and self-induced development that became hegemo-
nic in the 1950s and 1960s. Within this narrative structure, Japan was severed
from its regional contexts and portrayed as a society that had transformed
entirely from within. This overarching paradigm was corroborated by both
the dichotomies of the Cold War regime and the seemingly self-generated
take-off of Japan’s high-growth economy. On a discursive level, it was sup-
ported, and naturalized, by the rise of modernization theory.
Much has been written about the global diffusion of modernization theory
in the 1950s and 1960s as a new and decidedly anti-Communist ideology of
development.63 Conventionally, the arrival of modernization theory in Japan
has been interpreted as an import, linked to the “Conference on Modern
Japan” held in the summer of 1960 in Hakone, a small hot-springs resort
town just outside of Tokyo. The Ford Foundation sponsored the event,
which was prominently attended by American Ambassador Edwin
O. Reischauer, who saw exportation of modernization theory to be part of a
larger U.S. strategy in the global Cold War.64 As a result, many Japanese com-
mentators saw the project of rewriting the Japanese past, and of using an
abstract notion of “modernization” as the measure of social development, as
thinly veiled forms of cultural imperialism under the geopolitical conditions
of the Cold War.65
But this diffusionist account obscures the complex processes of knowl-
edge production and transnational exchange through which the notion of mod-
ernization took hold in postwar Japan. Modernization theory was in many ways
62 See Beatrice Trefalt, Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–
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Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); David Ekbladh, The
Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Prin-
ceton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
64 For accounts of the Hakone Conference, see Victor Koschmann, “Modernization and Demo-
cratic Values: The ‘Japanese Model’ in the 1960s,” in David C. Engerman et al., eds., Staging
Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 2003), 225–50; Stefan Tanaka, “Objectivism and the Eradication of Critique in Japa-
nese History,” in Masao Miyoshi and Harry D. Harootunian, eds., Learning Places: The Afterlives
of Area Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 80–102; Sebastian Conrad, “The Colonial
Ties Are Liquidated: Modernization Theory, Postwar Japan and the Global Cold War,” Past &
Present 216 (2012): 181–214.
65 See, for example, Wada Haruki, “Gendaiteki ‘Kindaika’ron no shisō to ronri,” Rekishigaku
kenkyû 318 (1966): 2–12.
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compatible with, and indeed was grafted onto, earlier Japanese theories of mod-
ernization. Beginning in the mid-1950s, a Japanese version of the moderniz-
ation concept had emerged that purported to explain the sudden economic
recovery and take-off. Even earlier, during the war years, historians like
Ōtsuka Hisao (1907–1996) had mined the work of Max Weber to develop a
theory of modernization that in many respects prefigured Parsonian moderniz-
ation theory of the 1960s. Thus American influences alone cannot explain the
hegemony of the “modernization” concept in Japan, and it must be understood
as a specific response to Japan’s postwar situation.66
For our purposes here, the various genealogies of modernization in Japan
are less important than the fact that all available versions of modernization
theory, whether “indigenous” or imported, operated within an internalist frame-
work. They gave only marginal attention to foreign influences, trans-border
contacts, transfers from abroad, or exchange and migration—the focus was
entirely on internal dispositions and mechanisms of internalization. This cele-
bration of endogenous development culminated in the apotheosis of Robinson
Crusoe, Max Weber’s “isolated economic man.”67 “What impressed us,”
admitted Ōtsuka in 1947, “was that he was organizing the reality he was
facing by creating a rational system of production … on such an isolated
island.”68
Ōtsuka translated Crusoe—the quintessential modernizer sui generis,
autonomous and relying on his own capacities—to the situation of postwar
Japan. In this reading, Japan likewise was expected to develop from within,
to rise like a phoenix from the ashes, and to modernize entirely on its own.
This was a view of the past that wrote Japan out of the world—just as the
logic of the Cold War seemed to have extricated Japan from its East Asian
contexts.
In many ways, this paradigm corresponded with a fundamental transform-
ation of the ideological make-up of postwar Japan, and of what it meant to be
“Japanese.” Oguma Eiji revealed one striking characteristic of this when
he demonstrated how, after 1945, the discourse on the ethnic foundations of
the nation underwent significant changes. The dominant discourse during the
war had represented the Japanese people as ethnically diverse (kongo
minzoku ron). In its essence, this ideology was distinctive to the Japanese
Empire, and displayed characteristic differences from the ideologies of
66 To be sure, Ōtsuka’s was a negative view of Japanese modernization, which he saw to be
characterized by structural deficits and an incomplete transition to modernity. See Sebastian
Conrad, The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 178–84.
67 Max Weber, Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (Munich: C. H. Beck,
2004), 197.
68 Ōtsuka Hisao, “Robinson Kurūsō no ningen ruikei,” in Ōtsuka Hisao chōsakushû, vol. 8
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 215.
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European empires. The Japanese, in this model, were an amalgamation of
southern and northern Asian peoples, including the native populations of
Taiwan and Korea. The union of these peoples within the Japanese Empire
could thus be interpreted not as an annexation but as a form of homecoming.
This perspective disappeared along with the empire, and in 1945 lost all
plausibility. The dominant discourse from then on rested on the construction
of a homogeneous Japanese people (tan’itsu minzoku ron), who dwelled on
their peaceful archipelago in ethnic isolation and purity.69 This view continues
to hold sway over the academic and popular self-assurance of the Japanese
nation today, with important social and juridical consequences. In 1951, this
new conception of the nation was legally confirmed when, in the Peace
Treaty of San Francisco, Japan renounced all territorial claims in Korea,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. From 1952 onward, the Japanese government
treated as foreigners all Koreans and Taiwanese who until then had been Japa-
nese citizens, with major implications for their freedom of movement, their
access to the labor market, and their claims to the benefits of the health and
social security systems.70 This transformation of the Japanese imagination,
and of the legal definition of who counted as “Japanese,” corresponded to
both the exigencies of the global Cold War and the vanishing of empire.71
J A PA N I N A S I A I N T H E 1990S
Japan’s empire did not fully return to the stage of public debate until the 1990s,
when it did so with a vengeance. Many perceived the January 1989 death of
Emperor Hirohito—the head of state since 1926 and a symbolic figure of
Japan’s wartime experience—as lifting a taboo on speaking about the
empire.72 More generally, the Cold War’s end helped to open up a new space
for debate, for new social actors and dissenting voices, and it produced dramatic
changes in the landscape of Japanese memory. The fall of the BerlinWall and the
breakdown of the Soviet Union were indicative of the end of the postwar world
order in the broadest sense. As the East-West dichotomy faded, so too did its
clear-cut framework, which had hitherto seemed to endow all events with politi-
cal meaning. In many respects, symbolic conflicts over the meanings of the past
69 The prewar discourse of the composite nation was not uncontested, and some authors empha-
sized absolute racial differences in East Asia. For an assessment of these different positions, see
Oguma Eiji, Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen: Nihonjin no jigazō no keifu (Tokyo: Shinyōsha,
1995).
70 See Won Soon Park, “Japanese Reparations Policies and the ‘Comfort Women’ Question,”
Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 5 (1997): 107–34. See also Sonia Ryang and John Lie,
eds., Diaspora without Homeland: Being Korean in Japan (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2009).
71 See also Ching, “‘Give Me Japan.”
72 Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: A Portrait of Japan at Century’s End
(New York: Vintage, 1993); Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and
Japan (London: Phoenix, 1994).
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took the place of earlier ideological antagonisms.73 As a result, the 1990s brought
what we might call an explosion of memory talk in Japan.
The most notable effect of the Cold War’s end was the change it spawned
in Japan’s relationship to her Asian neighbors. After a long period of relative
ignorance about the region among Japanese, the most important development
in the 1990s was what many perceived to be a return of “Asia.” There were
extended debates about Japan’s role in Asia, fledgling forms of regional politi-
cal cooperation emerged, trade within Asia soared, and not least, vociferous
discussions took place about the legacy of Japan’s imperial past. In contrast
to the public debates during the long postwar decades, these responded to inter-
ventions from memory activists in other Asian countries. Most notably, in
1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end, many Asian governments
and civil society groups demanded that the Japanese government make an offi-
cial apology for encroachments and atrocities during the time of empire.74
Debates about empire in Japan from that point onward can only be understood
within this broader context—those addressing issues of how to deal with the
past have had to constantly negotiate this highly disputed terrain.75
This context generated a number of heated debates that have reinstituted
the problem of empire as a central concern of public memory. The imperial
dimension of memory politics began to be played out in different arenas, all
of them highly contested and conflictual, to an extent that sociologist Kang
Sang-Jung wrote of a “civil war over memory.” While many of the issues
had previously been fought over by smaller expert communities and interest
groups and their constituencies, the debates now reached a mass audience
and polarized public opinion. For one example, discussions of the Nanjing mas-
sacre resurfaced. These already had a long history, but the issue was now used
to stake out diametrically opposed claims. Within nationalist discourse, the
atrocities were frequently denied, most prominently by Tokyo Mayor Ishihara
Shintarō, who denounced the term “massacre” as an invention of the Chinese
for propaganda purposes. Authors at the other end of the political spectrum,
too, did their best to popularize the issue, for example in the pamphlet Thirteen
Lies by the Deniers of the Nanjing Massacre, written in everyday language and
intended to appeal to a large, general public.76
73 See Carol Gluck, “The ‘End’ of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” Public
Culture 10 (1997): 1–23.
74 Seraphim, War Memory. See also Julia Adeney Thomas, “Landscape’s Mediation between
History and Memory: A Visual Approach to Japan’s Past, 1870–1945,” East Asian History 36
(2008): 55–72.
75 On the conflictual terrains of memory production between Japan and Korea in particular, see
Alexis Dudden, Troubled Apologies among Japan, Korea, and the United States (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008).
76 Nankin jiken chōsa kenkyûkai, Nankin daigyakusatsu hiteiron 13 no uso (Tokyo: Kashiwa
Shobō, 1999). For an analysis of this debate, see Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in
History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
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Another issue that came to the fore was the treatment of laborers who had
been coerced into serving private Japanese companies between 1939 and 1945.
The system had involved millions of people, most notably from Korea but also
from many other East and Southeast Asian countries. Through different types
of mobilization, ranging from deceptive recruitment to forms of enslavement,
workers were forced into a production process that was frequently brutal and
led to high mortality rates. Since most victims were illiterate, and the Japanese
later destroyed much of the relevant documentation, public consciousness of
the issue in Japan emerged relatively late compared with the awareness of
forced wartime labor in Europe. Beginning in the 1990s, former forced
workers gradually came to be recognized as war victims, and the first
schemes of compensation were developed.77
But the most conspicuous site for the reemergence of memories of empire
has been the issue of compensation for former so-called “comfort women”
( jûgun ianfu), a euphemistic term for women forced to be prostitutes in the
service of the Japanese army. During the war years, this system of sexual
slavery victimized an estimated eighty to two hundred thousand women and
girls from throughout Asia, particularly Korea and China. That there had
been such a system of forced prostitution was by no means unknown, but it
had not been a part of the public memory of the war. The matter entered
public consciousness only after the mid-1990s, as a result of a complex inter-
play of individual agency and institutional lobbying. Women’s groups in Korea
and in Japan took up the issue and, although governments continued to ignore
it, created a public space for its discussion that eventually made it possible for
former forced prostitutes to come forward and speak of their personal experi-
ences. The media then picked up the topic, and as pressure on the Japanese gov-
ernment grew, the so-called “Asian Women’s Fund” was established in 1995
with the avowed aim of compensating former “comfort women.” In Japan
and in neighboring countries alike the fund met a wave of criticism for deflect-
ing state responsibility by making the compensation a private rather than a gov-
ernmental task. Many former victims of the sex-slave system consequently
refused compensation because it allowed the state to avoid acknowledging
responsibility.78
77 Yamada Shōji, Koshō Tadashi, and Higuchi Yūichi, Chōsenjin senji rōdō dōin (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 2005); Paul A. Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire:
Unknown Histories (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2005).
78 On the issue of forced prostitution, see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in
the Japanese Military during World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Yuki
Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the
US Occupation (London: Routledge, 2002); Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual
Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2009).
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The return of empire to public debate in Japan has been remarkable in
many respects, but two aspects require special attention here. One is that the
phenomenon is not limited to any one part of the political spectrum; the
issue is pervasive, and questions of the implications of the former empire
and its relevance to the present and future are almost ubiquitous.79 On one
side, critical and oppositional voices have made convincing claims that
coming to terms with the Japanese past must be based on a thorough engage-
ment with the history of empire. A case in point was the International Women’s
War Crimes Tribunal conducted in Tokyo in the year 2000 with the explicit aim
of revisiting, and thereby improving upon, the War Crimes Trial of 1946. The
latter was increasingly seen as having eschewed the issue of empire and, much
noted in this context, having ignored the crimes committed against women.80
Within the academy, the rise of postcolonial scholarship created a space
for the recognition of empire as one of the enabling structures of Japanese mod-
ernity, and for the re-imagining of Japanese history in Asia. The colonies had
long been treated mostly as an appendix to narratives that focused on the
internal dynamics of Japanese modernization. To the extent that Japanese colo-
nialism was mentioned, it was interpreted as but an extension and copy of prior
developments in the metropole.81 Under the influence of postcolonial studies,
the framework has fundamentally changed, and recent scholarship has explored
the extent to which the social transformations of modern Japan need to be situ-
ated within a broader, colonial setting. Landmark studies have included Kan
Sang Jung’s notion of the Orientalizing gaze as precondition for Japanese mod-
ernity, Komagome Takeshi’s work on the role of the colonial “Other” in con-
structing Japanese cultural identity, and research into the standardization of the
Japanese language (kokugo) under conditions of coloniality.82 More recently,
scholars have moved beyond the realms of discourse and representation to
look at the ways in which the colonies were treated by bureaucrats, the military,
and reformist intellectuals as privileged sites where social interventions could be
tested. In these studies, the formation of modernity in Japan and in her colonies is
increasingly analyzed within a single analytical field.
The intention to link the critical perspectives on empire to a broader his-
torical consciousness has led to initiatives to write a textbook that captures per-
spectives from the different countries involved. Throughout Japan’s postwar
79 See Iwasaki Minoru et al., eds., Keizoku suru shokuminchishugi: Jendā, minzoku, jinshu,
kaikyû (Tokyo: Seikyûsha, 2005).
80 See VAWW-NET Japan, Nihon gunsei doreisei o sabaku: 2000nen josei kokusai senpan
hōteino kiroku, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Ryokufu Shuppan, 2000–2002).
81 See Schmid, “Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem.’”
82 Kang Sang-jung, Orientarizumu no kanata e; Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku
Nihon no bunka tōgō; Yi Yo˘n-suk, ‘Kokugo’ to iu shisō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996); Yasuda
Toshiaki, Shokuminchi no naka no ‘kokugogaku’ (Tokyo: Sangensha, 1997). See also Motoyama
Tetsuya, Posuto koroniarizumu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005).
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history, school textbooks have been one of the crucial sites where divergent
claims to the past were negotiated across the deep chasms between oppositional
academics, the state establishment, and nationalist groups. The 2005 publi-
cation of a joint textbook co-authored by historians from China, South
Korea, and Japan was therefore a highly symbolic event. Its aim was to articu-
late the modern history of East Asia from three different, albeit intertwined per-
spectives, with a specific focus on empire.83 The book sold over seventy
thousand copies in Japan, thirty thousand in South Korea, and one hundred
and twenty thousand in China, even though it was not officially approved
and so was not used in schools. This tripartite text was the most spectacular
among a number of multilateral initiatives between Japan, South Korea, and
China. Though it remained firmly wedded to narratives of national history, jux-
taposing three “national” interpretations of selected events, it nevertheless
benefited from recent attempts by historians to interpret the past in a framework
that transcended national borders.84 The book is part of a larger move toward
reinscribing Japanese history within an Asian context,85 and recognizing the
importance of East Asian “sites of memory” for locating Japan within the
current global conjuncture.86 One of the most conspicuous historical
moments in this “Asianization” of the Japanese past—one that marked a
clear break from the erasure of empire during the “long postwar” period—
was when an influential 2005 publication designated the wartime period as
the “Asia-Pacific War” (Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō).87
The return of the empire was not only of concern to the self-styled pro-
gressive left. On the political right, the memory of Japan’s colonial project
now experienced renewed popularity. A recent example is a scandal surround-
ing General Tamogami Toshio, who in October 2008 demonstratively defended
Japan’s colonialism and war actions.88 The case for a more positive evaluation
of the country’s imperial past—in some ways comparable to French
83 Nitchūkan Sangoku Kyōtsū Rekishi Kyōzai Iinkai, Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Ajia sankoku no
kingendaishi (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2005).
84 Sakai Naoki, Brett de Bary, and Iyotani Toshio, eds., Nashonariti no datsukōchiku (Tokyo:
Kashiwa Shobō, 1996); Komori Yōichi and Takahashi Tetsuya, eds., Nashonaru hisutorī Ō
koete (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1998); Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Daqing Yang,
Kokkyō o koeru rekishi ninshiki: Nitchū taiwa no kokoromi (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai,
2006); Hiroshi Mitani and Tae-Chang Kim, eds., Higashi Ajia rekishi taiwa—Kokkyō to sedai o
koete (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007).
85 Okamoto Takashi, Sekai no naka no Nisshin-Kan kankeishi: kōrin to zokkoku, jishu to dokur-
itsu (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2008).
86 See Itagaku Ryûta, Chon Jiyon, and Iwasaki Minoru, eds., Tōajia no kioku no ba (Tokyo:
Kawade Shobō, 2011).
87 Kurasawa Aiko et al., eds., Kōza—Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō, vols. 1–8 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
2005–2006). See also Matsuura Masataka, “Dai Tōa Sensō” wa naze okita no ka: han Ajia shugi
no seiji keizaishi (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2010).
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stipulations that teachers and textbooks “acknowledge and recognize in particu-
lar the positive role of the French presence abroad, especially in North
Africa”—dates back to the 1990s. That is when revisionist historians sought
to instill a sense of pride in the nation and replace what they denounced as
the “masochistic view of history” that had become hegemonic in the postwar
decades.89 Here, too, textbooks were the preferred media, as nationalist intel-
lectuals like Fujioka Nobukatsu and Nishio Kanji worked to inculcate the
next generation of Japanese with the new nationalist gospel. Their writings
sold millions of copies and reached a huge audience, easily exceeding those
of the critical textbooks.90
Part of the appeal of the revisionists lay in their conventional valorization
of the war. Prominent examples included the film “Pride,” in which the role of
General Tōjō Hideki, who was executed as a war criminal, received a favorable
revaluation; and the commercially highly successful comic “On the War” (Sen-
sōron), by the popular illustrator Kobayashi Yoshinori.91 But increasingly the
focus has shifted to the former colonized territories, and a reassessment of
Japan’s contribution to the modernization of those subject nations. In these
interpretations, Japanese colonialism emerges as a relatively benevolent and
benign form of rule, with positive effects for the economic, infrastructural,
social, and cultural development of the colonies. “On Taiwan” (Taiwanron
2000), another comic by Kobayashi Yoshinori, expressed this neo-nationalist
orthodoxy and stirred protest upon release in Taiwan. It sold more than two
hundred and fifty thousand copies in Japan.92 Like their opponents on the pol-
itical left, nationalists have tried to insert, and in their case legitimate, the
twentieth-century empire in a longer history of Japan in Asia.93
The history of empire, then, has returned and has been appropriated across
the political spectrum by varied interests and with different implications. But
though the memory of empire is now firmly entrenched in Japanese public
and political debates, this has not been due to the work of Japanese actors
alone. A second dimension of the return of empire that I want to briefly con-
sider here is that, since the 1990s, the debate on memory in Japan has taken
89 Fujioka Nobukatsu, Ojoku no kingendaishi (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1996).
90 See, especially, Fujioka Nobukatsu, ed., Kyōkasho ga oshienai rekishi, 4 vols. (Tokyo:
Tokuma Shoten, 1996–98); See also the vehement reactions to these approaches in: Kyōkasho ni
shinjitsu to jiyū o‘ renrakukai, ed., Tettei hihan: ‘Kokumin no rekishi’ (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten,
2000); Hiroshi Mitani, ed., Rekishi kyōkasho mondai (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentâ, 2007).
91 Kobayashi Yoshinori, Sensōron (Tokyo: Gentôsha, 1998). However, popular versions of the
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92 Kobayashi Yoshinori, Taiwanron (Tokyo: Shôgakkan, 2000). On the debate, see Higashi Ajia
Bunshitetsu Nettowāku, ed., Kobayashi Yoshinori Taiwanron o koete: Taiwan eno atarashii shiza
(Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2001); Marukawa Tetsushi, “On Kobayashi Yoshinori’s On Taiwan,” Pos-
itions: East Asia Cultures Critique 12 (2004): 93–112.
93 See, for example, Kawakatsu Heita, Nihon bunmei to kindai seiyō (Tokyo: NHK Books,
1991); Nishio Kanji, Kokumin no rekishi, Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai, ed. (Tokyo:
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on a decidedly transnational dimension. To be sure, this is not in itself a com-
pletely new phenomenon, and memory debates in any country never evolve in
isolation. What has been new is the urgency with which actors from outside of
Japan have intervened, and clamored for and eventually received a hearing
within Japanese debates. Moreover, the composition of the voices that have
gained a hearing in Japan shifted markedly. While positions and models
from the United States and Europe—such as the Enola Gay controversy, the
German-Polish textbook negotiations, and the 1985 speech of German Presi-
dent Richard von Weizsäcker—have continued to influence the Japanese
public, what is noteworthy is the degree to which participants from other
Asian countries, most of them non-state activists, have helped transform a Japa-
nese preoccupation with Japan’s national past into a transnational endeavor.94
In the 1990s, individuals and civil society groups from other Asian nations
began to play leading roles in a shifting terrain of Japanese memory production.
Through these various and sometimes discordant interventions, they contribu-
ted to the emergence of what Lisa Yoneyama has called “postnationalist public
spheres in the production of historical knowledge.”95 The multiplication of
actors and the discursive coalitions across national boundaries attest to both
the centrality of memory politics in Japan today and the crucial role of
empire/“Asia” in the context of contemporary Japanese debate.96
C O N C L U S I O N
After long decades in which it resided in relative oblivion, Japan’s imperial past
finally returned to the public consciousness in the 1990s. But has it really
returned? On the surface of things, the current obsession with the imperial
legacy may appear as the “return of the repressed.” As in many other post-
imperial countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Portugal, the
memory of empire has reemerged after what some commentators, borrowing
language from psychoanalysis, have described as forgetting, and “amnesia.”
There are indeed important continuities to consider, since some of the civil
society groups that have campaigned since the early postwar years for recog-
nition of Japanese victimization of other Asians have remained important
players into the new millennium. Individual actors, such as journalist Honda
94 On the German model, see Awaya Kentarō, ed., Sensō sekinin—sengo sekinin: Nihon to
Doitsu wa dō chigau ka (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994); Satō Takeo, “Doitsu no sengo
hoshō—Nihon no mohan ka,” Sekai 561 (1991): 296–309; Nishio Kanji, Kotonaru higeki:
Nihon to Doitsu (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjû, 1994).
95 Lisa Yoneyama, “Transformative Knowledge and Postnationalist Public Sphere: The Smith-
sonian Enola Gay Controversy,” in Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, eds.,
Perilous Memories: The Asia Pacific Wars (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): 323–46.
96 See Norma Field, “War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After,” Positions: East
Asia Cultures Critique 5, 1 (1997): 165–88; Gluck, “Operations of Memory.”
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Katsuichi, have stayed at the forefront of political and legal battles over how to
read the wartime and imperial past.
It is also clear that the upsurge in memory activity has had a generational
element, at least partly. Those who had experienced the empire themselves and
could still remember it knew they would not be around much longer. This bio-
logical factor has plainly contributed to the heated nature of some of the con-
flicts, especially when issues of monetary or symbolic compensation were at
stake. In addition, there developed an urgent need to document and testify to
personal experiences at a time when only a few witnesses were still alive.
The extraordinary boom of personal histories ( jibunshi) composed by innumer-
able “ordinary Japanese” is testimony to the generational dynamic at work.97
And yet, in many ways the exploding interest in issues of empire was not
only a return; it was also a new departure, since continuities with a shared Asian
past proved important but were soon subsumed within the dynamics set in
motion by shifting geopolitical grounds. A crucial factor behind the boom of
the trope of empire was the dissolution of the Cold War order, which opened
up a new space for the articulation of claims on the past. In particular, the
end of a regime that was essentially formatted according to the East-West
dichotomy sparked a process that allowed political groups and civil society
initiatives, and also corporate interests, to focus on East Asia as a region. Insti-
tutions of political cooperation began to emerge, and there was a marked
increase in NGO actions on issues ranging from the environment and water
management, to migration, to terrorism. At the same time, beginning from
about the mid-1990s, East Asia increasingly became a region of intensive
trade relations. In Japan, trade with the neighboring Asian countries surpassed
economic exchange with the United States in 1993. Ironically, this was the
same year that the Liberal Democratic Party, with its fixation on the United
States, lost its long-held, dominant position in parliament. Most conspicuously,
culture has emerged as a crucial site for integration in East Asia, including ideo-
logical claims to cultural commonalities such as Confucianism and the
so-called “Asian values,” and material forms of exchange of a popular
culture that is increasingly consumed transnationally.98
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This broader process of regionalization as one feature of the globalized,
post-Cold War order had important repercussions in the field of memory. It
shifted the parameters of public debate, enabled new discursive and political
coalitions to emerge, and palpably turned interpretations of the imperial past
into a privileged arena within which possibilities of Asian exchange and
cooperation were negotiated. This was, then, not primarily a return of
empire, but the arrival of Asia, conditioned by global geopolitical transform-
ations and new structures of global capitalism.99 At this juncture, the
memory of Japanese colonialism became one of the currencies of exchange
that made integration possible, and rendered different national trajectories com-
patible. Consequently, some observers disapproved of Prime Minister Koizu-
mi’s controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine not so much for their nationalist
overtones and distorted view of the past, but rather because of fears that they
would present an obstacle to Japanese access to Asian markets. The public con-
cerns with Asia and empire in post-1990s Japan must be situated within this
context of emerging regionalism and regionalist agendas, not only in East
Asia but across the globe.
Abstract: Between 1895 and 1945 Japan assembled one of the largest empires in
modern world history. It vanished abruptly in the summer of 1945 at the end of
the Second World War, and seemed to leave no trace in public consciousness.
Historians, too, have portrayed postwar Japan as characterized by a virtual
erasure of the imperial past. This article draws on recent scholarship to argue
that things were more complicated than that. While references to the imperial
past indeed dwindled after about 1960, immediate forgetting did not exhaust
the reactions by individuals and interest groups. Some social milieus experienced
the dissolution of the empire much more profoundly than official discourse would
suggest. Since the mid-1990s, Japan’s imperial past has reemerged as a major
field of historical inquiry and a more general concern in public debate. In this
article I situate the dialectic of remembering and forgetting within larger pro-
cesses and transformations of the postwar order in East Asia, in particular the
American occupation and the emergence of the Cold War.
99 Leo Ching, “Globalizing the Regional, Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture and Asianism
in the Age of Late Capital,” Public Culture 12 (2000): 233–57.
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